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Abstract
A new approach to play games quantum mechanically is proposed. We con-
sider two players who perform measurements in an EPR-type setting. The payoff
relations are defined as functions of correlations, i.e. without reference to classical
or quantum mechanics. Classical bi-matrix games are reproduced if the input
states are classical and perfectly anti-correlated, that is, for a classical correlation
game. However, for a quantum correlation game, with an entangled singlet state
as input, qualitatively different solutions are obtained. For example, the Prisoners’
Dilemma acquires a Nash equilibrium if the players both apply a mixed strategy.
It appears to be conceptually impossible to reproduce the properties of quantum
correlation games within the framework of classical games.
PACS: 03.67.-a, 02.50.Le
1 Introduction
To process information has been conceived for a long time as a purely mathematical
task, independent of the carrier of information. However, problems such as identifying a
marked object in a database [1] or the factorization of large integer numbers [2] are solved
in a highly efficient way if information is stored and processed quantum mechanically.
Hence, the theory of quantum information came into existence generalizing classical bits
to qubits : linear combinations of classically incompatible states are possible, and they
can be processed simultaneously.
Game theory [3], a tool to take decisions in a rational way, has been proposed as
another promising candidate to benefit from a quantum mechanical implementation [4].
Based on their knowledge of the circumstances, players in a classical game select from
a set of possible moves or actions to maximize their payoffs. In its quantum version,
unexpected moves may provide new solutions to the game; a strategy which includes
quantum moves may outperform a classical strategy [5]. Opinions about the true quan-
tum character of such games are divided, however. It has been argued that quantized
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games are nothing but disguised classical games [6]. In other words, to quantize a game
is claimed equivalent to replacing the original game by a different classical game.
In the present paper, we associate a quantum game with a classical game in a way
which addresses this criticism by imposing two constraints:
(c1) The players choose their moves (or actions) from the same set in both the classical
and the quantized game.
(c2) The players agree on explicit expressions for their payoffs which must not be
modified when switching between the classical and the quantized version of the
game.
Games with these properties are expected to be immune against the criticism raised
above. In the new setting, the only ‘parameter’ is the input state on which the players
act, and its nature will determine the classical or quantum character of the game. Our
approach to quantum games, tailored to satisfy both (c1) and (c2), is inspired by Bell’s
work [7]: correlations of measurement outcomes are essential. Effectively, we will define
payoff relations in terms of correlations - these payoffs will become sensitive to the
classical or quantum nature of the input allowing for modified Nash equilibria.
Section 2 introduces our notation of classical games. Then, games will be set up
in a way which resembles an EPR experiment. In Section 4, correlation games will be
defined through payoffs depending explicitly on correlations. If played on a classical
input state, they reproduce classical bi-matrix games. New advantageous strategies
may emerge, however, if the same payoff relations are used in the quantum mechanical
setting, as shown in Section 5. Finally, we discuss achievements and limitations of our
approach.
2 Matrix games and payoffs
Consider a matrix game [8] for two players, called Alice and Bob. A large set of identical
objects are prepared in definite states, not necessarily known to the players. Each object
splits into two equivalent ‘halves’ handed over to Alice and Bob simultaneously. Let the
players agree beforehand on the following rules:
1. Alice and Bob may either play the identity move I or perform actions SA and SB,
respectively. The moves SA,B (and I) consist of unique actions such as flipping a
coin (or not) and possibly reading it.
2. The players agree upon payoff relations PA,B(pA, pB) which determine their awards
as functions of their strategies, that is, the moves with probabilities pA,B assigned
to them.
3. The players fix their strategies for repeated runs of the game. In a mixed strategy
Alice plays the identity move I with probability pA, say, while she plays SA with
probability pA = 1 − pA, and similarly for Bob. In a pure strategy, each player
performs the same action in each run.
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4. Whenever the players receive their part of the system, they perform a move con-
sistent with their strategy.
5. The players inform an arbiter about their actions taken in each individual run.
After a large number of runs, they are rewarded according to the agreed payoff
relations PA,B. The existence of the arbiter is for clarity only: alternatively, the
players get together to decide on their payoffs.
These conventions are sufficient to play a classical game. As an example, consider
the class of symmetric bi-matrix games with payoff relations
PA(pA, pB) = KpApB + LpA +MpB +N,
PB(pA, pB) = KpApB +MpA + LpB +N, (1)
where K,L,M, and N are real numbers. Being functions of two real variables, 0 ≤
pA,B ≤ 1, the payoff relations PA,B reflect that each player may chose a strategy from a
continuous one-parameter set. The game is symmetric since
PA(pA, pB) = PB(pB, pA). (2)
Look at pure strategies with pA,B = 0 or 1 in Eq. (1):
PA(1, 1) = PB(1, 1) = r = K + L+M +N,
PA(1, 0) = PB(0, 1) = s = L+N,
PA(0, 1) = PB(1, 0) = t = M +N,
PA(0, 0) = PB(0, 0) = u = N, (3)
leading to the payoff matrix for this game
Alice
I
SA
Bob
I SB(
(r, r) (s, t)
(t, s) (u, u)
)
. (4)
In words: If both Alice and Bob play the identity I, they are paid r units; Alice
playing the identity I and Bob playing SB pays s and t units to them, respectively; etc.
Knowledge of the payoff matrix (4) and the probabilities pA,B is, in fact, equivalent to
(1) since the expected payoffs PA,B are obtained by averaging (4) over many runs.
Let Alice and Bob act rationally: they will try to maximize their payoffs1 by an
appropriate strategy [3]. If the entries of the matrix (4) satisfy s < u < r < t, the Pris-
oners’ Dilemma [8] arises: the players opt for strategies in which unilateral deviations are
disadvantageous; nevertheless, the resulting solution of the game, a Nash equilibrium,
does not maximize their payoffs.
In view of the conditions (c1) and (c2) the form of the payoff relations PA,B in (1)
seems to leave no room to introduce quantum games which would differ from classical
ones. In the following, we will introduce payoff relations which are sensitive to whether a
game is played on classical or quantum objects. With classical input, they will reproduce
the classical game, and the conditions (c1) and (c2) will be respected throughout.
1The authors do not consider this the only possible definition of rationality.
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3 EPR-type setting of matrix games
Correlation games will be defined in a setting which is inspired by EPR-type experiments
[9]. Alice and Bob are spatially separated, and they share information about a Cartesian
coordinate system with axes ex, ey, ez. The physical input used in a correlation game is
a large number of identical systems with zero angular momentum, J = 0. Each system
decomposes into a pair of objects which carry perfectly anti-correlated angular momenta
JA,B, i.e. JA + JB = 0.
In each run, Alice and Bob will measure the dichotomic variable e · J/|e · J| of their
halves along the common z-axis (e→ ez) or along specific directions e→ eA and e→ eB
in two planes PA and PB, respectively, each containing the z-axis, as shown in Fig. 1.
The vectors eA and eB are characterized by the angles θA and θB which they enclose
with the z-axis:
ez · eA,B = cos θA,B , 0 ≤ θA,B ≤ π. (5)
In principle, Alice and Bob could be given the choice of both the directions eA,B and the
probabilities pA,B. However, in traditional matrix games each player has access to one
continuous variable only, namely pA,B. To remain within this framework, we impose a
relation between the probabilities pA,B ∈ [0, 1], and the angles θA,B ∈ [0, π]:
pA,B = g(θA,B) . (6)
The function g maps the interval [0, π] to [0, 1], and it is specified before the game begins.
This function is, in general, not required to be invertible or continuous. Relation (6) says
that Alice must play the identity with probability pA ≡ g(θA) if she decides to select
the direction eA as her alternative to ez; furthermore, she measures with probability
pA = 1 − g(θA) along eA. For an invertible function g, Alice can choose either a
probability pA or a direction θA and find the other variable from Eq. (6). If the function
g is not invertible, some values of probability are associated with more than one angle,
and it is more natural to have the players choose a direction first. For simplicity we will
assume the function g to be invertible, if not specified otherwise.
According to her chosen strategy, Alice will measure the quantity e · J/|e · J| with
probability pA along the z-axis, and with probability pA = 1 − pA along the direction
eA. Similarly, Bob can play a mixed strategy, measuring along the directions ez or eB
with probabilities pB and pB, respectively. Hence, Alice’s moves consists of either SA
(rotating a Stern-Gerlach type apparatus from ez to eA, followed by a measurement) or
of I (a measurement along ez with no previous rotation). Bob’s moves I and SB are
defined similarly. It is convenient to denote the outcomes of measurements along the
directions eA, eB, and ez, by a, b, and c, respectively.
After each run, the players inform the arbiter about the chosen directions and the
result of their measurements. After N → ∞ runs of the game, the arbiter possesses
a list L indicating the directions of the measurements selected by the players and the
measured values of the quantity e · J/|e · J|. The arbiter uses the list to determine the
strategies played by Alice and Bob by simply counting the number of times (NA, say)
that Alice measured along eA, giving pA = lim
N→∞
(N − NA)/N , etc. Finally, the players
are rewarded according to the payoff relations (1).
4
           
           
           
           
       Z      
           
           
           
           
           
           
     eA        
           
     A            B   eB  
 
 
              
                                                                                                                Y 
 
 
 
        
                       X   
 
Figure 1: The players’ strategies consist of defining angles θA,B which the directions
eA,B make with the z-axis; for simplicity, the planes PA,B are chosen as the xz- and
yz-plane, respectively.
4 Correlation games
We now develop a new perspective of matrix games in the EPR-type setting. The
basic idea is to define payoffs PA,B = PA,B(〈ac〉 , 〈cb〉) which depend explicitly on the
correlations of the actual measurements performed by Alice and Bob. The arbiter will
extract the numerical values of the correlations 〈ac〉 etc. from the list L in the usual
way. Consider, for example, all cases with Alice measuring along eA and Bob along ez.
If there are Nac such runs, the correlation of the measurements is defined by
〈ac〉 = lim
Nac→∞
(
Nac∑
n=1
ancn
Nac
)
, (7)
where an and cn take the values ±1 [9]. The correlations 〈ab〉 and 〈cb〉 are defined
similarly.
A symmetric bi-matrix correlation game is determined by a function g in (6) and by
the relations
PA(〈ac〉 , 〈cb〉) = K G(〈ac〉)G(〈cb〉) + L G(〈ac〉) +M G(〈cb〉) +N,
PB(〈ac〉 , 〈cb〉) = K G(〈ac〉)G(〈cb〉) +M G(〈ac〉) + L G(〈cb〉) +N, (8)
where, in view of later developments, the function G is taken to be
G(x) = g
(π
2
(1 + x)
)
, x ∈ [0, 1]. (9)
As they stand, the payoff relations (8) do refer to neither a classical nor a quantum
mechanical input. Hence, condition (c2) from above is satisfied: the payoff relations
used in the classical and the quantum version of the game are identical, namely given
by Eqs. (8). Furthermore, Alice and Bob choose from the same set of moves in both
versions of the game: they select directions eA and eB (with probabilities pA,B associated
with θA,B via (6)) so that condition (c1) is satisfied. Nevertheless, the solutions of the
correlation game (8) will depend on the input being either a classical or a quantum
mechanical anti-correlated state.
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4.1 Classical correlation games
Alice and Bob play a classical correlation game if they receive classically anti-correlated
pairs and use the payoff relations (8). In this case, the payoffs turn into
P clA,B = PA,B(〈ac〉cl , 〈cb〉cl), (10)
where the correlations, characteristic for classically anti-correlated systems [9], are given
by
〈ac〉cl = −1 + 2θA/π,
〈cb〉cl = −1 + 2θB/π. (11)
Use now the definition of the function G in (9) and the link (6) between probabilities
pA,B and angles θA,B to obtain
G(〈ac〉) = g(θA) = pA, (12)
G(〈cb〉) = g(θB) = pB. (13)
Hence, for classical input Eqs. (8) reproduce the payoffs of a symmetric bi-matrix game
(1),
P clA (pA, pB) = KpApB + LpA +MpB +N,
P clB (pA, pB) = KpApB +MpA + LpB +N. (14)
The game-theoretic analysis of the classical correlation game is now straightforward—for
example, appropriate values of the parameters (r, s, t, u) lead to the Prisoners’ Dilemma,
for any invertible function g.
4.2 Quantum correlation games
Imagine now that Alice and Bob receive quantum mechanical anti-correlated singlet
states
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|+,−〉 − |−,+〉) . (15)
They are said to play a quantum correlation game if again they use the payoff relations
(8) which read in this case
P qA,B = PA,B(〈ac〉q , 〈cb〉q). (16)
As before, Alice and Bob transmit the results of their measurements (on their quantum
halves) to the arbiter who, after a large number of runs, determines the correlations
〈ac〉q and 〈cb〉q by the formula (7)
〈ac〉q = − cos θA,
〈cb〉q = − cos θB, (17)
in contrast to (11).
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The inverse of relation (6), then, links the probabilities and correlations through
〈ac〉q = − cos
(
g−1(pA)
)
,
〈cb〉q = − cos
(
g−1(pB)
)
. (18)
Plugging these expressions into the right-hand-side of (16), we obtain quantum payoffs:
P qA(pA, pB) = KQg(pA)Qg(pB) + LQg(pA) +MQg(pB) +N,
P qB(pA, pB) = KQg(pA)Qg(pB) +MQg(pB) + LQg(pA) +N. (19)
where
Qg(pA,B) = g
(π
2
(
1− cos (g−1(pA,B)))) ∈ [0, 1]. (20)
The payoffs P qA,B turn out to be non-linear functions of the probabilities pA,B while the
payoffs P clA,B of the classical correlation game are bi-linear. This modification has an
impact on the solutions of the game as shown in the following section.
5 Nash equilibria of quantum correlation games
What are the properties of the quantum payoffs P qA,B compared to the classical ones,
P clA,B? The standard approach to ‘solving games’ consists in studying Nash equilibria.
For a bi-matrix game a pair of strategies (p⋆A, p
⋆
B) is a Nash equilibrium if each players’
payoff does not increase upon unilateral deviation from it,
PA(pA, p
⋆
B) ≤ PA(p⋆A, p⋆B) , for all pA,
PB(p
⋆
A, pB) ≤ PB(p⋆A, p⋆B) , for all pB. (21)
In the following, we will study the differences between classical and quantum correlation
games which are associated with two paradigmatic games: the Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD)
and the Battle of Sexes (BoS).
The payoff matrix of the PD has been introduced in (4). It will be convenient to
use the notation of game theory: C ∼ I corresponds to Cooperation, while D ∼ SA,B
is the strategy of Defection. A characteristic feature of this game is that the condition
s < u < r < t guarantees that the strategy D dominates the strategy C for both players
and that the unique equilibrium at (D,D) is not Pareto optimal. An outcome of a game
is Pareto optimal if there is no other outcome that makes one or more players better
off and no player worse off. This can be seen in the following way. The conditions (21)
read explicitly
0 ≤ (Kp⋆B + L) (p⋆A − pA) , for all pA,
0 ≤ (Kp⋆A + L) (p⋆B − pB) , for all pB. (22)
with K and L from (3). The inequalities have only one solution
p⋆A = p
⋆
B = 0 , (23)
which corresponds to (D,D), a pure strategy for both players. The PD is said to have
a pure Nash equilibrium.
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The BoS is defined by the following payoff matrix:
Alice
I
SA
Bob
I SB(
(α, β) (γ, γ)
(γ, γ) (β, α)
)
, (24)
where I and SA,B are pure strategies and α > β > γ. Three Nash equilibria arise in
the classical BoS, two of which are pure: (I, I) and (SA, SB). The third one is a mixed
equilibrium where Alice and Bob play I with probabilities
p⋆A =
α− γ
α + β − 2γ , p
⋆
B =
β − γ
α + β − 2γ . (25)
For the quantum correlation game associated with the generalized PD, the conditions
(21) turn into
0 ≤ (KQg(p⋆B) + L) (Qg(p⋆A)−Qg(pA)) , (26)
0 ≤ (KQg(p⋆A) + L) (Qg(p⋆B)−Qg(pB)) , (27)
where the range of Qg(pA,B) has been defined in (20). Thus, the conditions for a Nash
equilibrium of a quantum correlation game are structurally similar to those of the classi-
cal game except for non-linear dependence on the probabilities pA,B. The only solutions
of (27) therefore read
Qg(p
⋆
A) = Qg(p
⋆
B) = 0 , (28)
generating upon inversion a Nash equilibrium at
(p⋆A)q = (p
⋆
B)q = Q
−1
g (0) = g
(
arccos
(
1− 2
π
g−1(0)
))
, (29)
where the transformed probabilities now come with a subscript q indicating the presence
of quantum correlations. The location of this new equilibrium depends on the actual
choice of the function g, as is shown below.
Similar arguments apply to the pure Nash equilibria of the BoS game while the mixed
classical equilibrium (25) is transformed into
(p⋆A)q = Q
−1
g (p
⋆
A) = g
(
arccos
(
1− 2
π
g−1(
α− γ
α + β − 2γ )
))
,
(p⋆B)q = Q
−1
g (p
⋆
B) = g
(
arccos
(
1− 2
π
g−1(
β − γ
α + β − 2γ )
))
. (30)
When defining a quantum correlation game we need to specify a function g which
establishes the link between probabilities pA,B and angles θA,B. We will study the prop-
erties of quantum correlation games for g-functions of increasing complexity. In the
simplest case, the function g is (i) continuous and invertible; next, we chose a function
g being (ii) invertible and discontinuous or (iii) non-invertible and discontinuous. For
simplicity, all examples are worked out for piecewise linear g-functions. The general-
ization to smooth g-functions turns out to be straightforward, and the results do not
change qualitatively as long as the g function preserves its characteristic features.
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(i) Continuous and invertible g-functions
Consider the function g1(θ) = θ/π defined for θ ∈ [0, π]. We have g1(0, π) = 0 or 1, and
the classical and quantum correlations coincide at θ = 0, π/2, and π. In view of (29)
the function g1 can have no effect on pure Nash equilibria and the classical solution of
PD is not modified in the quantum game. Fig. 2 shows the function g1.
  
 1 
 
 
 
 g 
 
 
 
  
 0         θ   π    
Figure 2: The invertible and continuous g-function g1(θ) = θ/π.
However, solutions p⋆A,B ∈ (0, 1) correspond to a mixed classical equilibrium. It will
be modified if g(π/2) 6= p⋆A,B i.e. when the angle associated with p⋆A,B is different from
π/2. For example with the function g1(θ) the probabilities of the mixed equilibrium of
the quantum correlation BoS are (p⋆A)q = 1 − (1/π) arccos {(α− γ)/(α+ β − 2γ)} and
(p⋆B)q = 1− (1/π) arccos {(β − γ)/(α + β − 2γ)}. A similar result holds for the function
g2(θ) = 1− θ/π.
(ii) Invertible and discontinuous g-functions
For simplicity we consider invertible functions that are discontinuous at one point only.
Piecewise linear functions are typical examples. One such function, shown in Fig. 3, is
g3(θ) =
{
δ(1− θ/ǫ) if θ ∈ [0, ǫ] ,
δ + (1− δ)(θ − ǫ)/(π − ǫ) if θ ∈ (ǫ, π) . (31)
The classical solution of PD p⋆A = p
⋆
B = 0 disappears; the new quantum solution is found
at
(p⋆A)q = (p
⋆
B)q =
{
δ + (1−δ)
(π−ǫ)
{arccos(1− 2ǫ/π)− ǫ} if ǫ ∈ [0, π
2
] ,
δ
{
1− 1
ǫ
arccos(1− 2ǫ/π)} if ǫ ∈ (π
2
, π] .
(32)
If, for example, δ = 1/2 and ǫ = π/4, we obtain a mixed equilibrium at (p⋆A)q = (p
⋆
B)q =
5/9. The appearance of a mixed equilibrium in a quantum correlation PD game is an
entirely non-classical feature.
The presence of a mixed equilibrium in the quantum correlation PD gives rise to an
interesting question: is there a Pareto-optimal solution of (C,C) in a quantum correla-
tion PD with some invertible and discontinuous g-function? No such solution exists for
invertible and continuous g-functions. Also, the (C,C) equilibrium in PD cannot appear
9
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   0   ε                θ     pi  
Figure 3: Invertible and discontinuous g-function defined in Eq. (31).
in a quantum correlation game played with the function (31): one has g−1(1) = π which
can not be equal to g−1(0) when g is invertible. As a matter of fact, the solution (C,C)
for PD can be realized in a quantum correlation PD if one considers g from (32) with
ǫ = π/2:
g4(θ) =
{
δ(1− 2θ/π) if θ ∈ [0, π
2
] ,
1− 2(1− δ)(θ − π/2)/π if θ ∈ (π
2
, π] ,
(33)
where δ ∈ (0, 1), depicted in Fig. 4. 
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        g  
 
          δ  
 
 
              
   0    2/pi            θ  pi  
Figure 4: Invertible and discontinuous g-function defined in Eq. (33).
This function satisfies g−1(0) = g−1(1) = π/2. Therefore, one has cos {g−1(1)} =
1−2g−1(0)/π, which is the condition for (C,C) to be an equilibrium in PD. Cooperation
(C,C) will also be an equilibrium in PD if the g-function is defined as
g5(θ) =
{
2(1− δ)θ/π + δ if θ ∈ [0, π
2
] ,
2δ(θ − π/2)/π if θ ∈ (π
2
, π] ,
(34)
where δ ∈ (0, 1). Fig. 5 shows this function.
In both cases (33,34), the g-function has a discontinuity at θ = π/2. With these
functions both the pure and mixed classical equilibria of BoS will also be susceptible to
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Figure 5: Invertible and discontinuous g-function defined in Eq. (34).
change. The shifts in the pure equilibria in BoS will be similar to those of PD but the
mixed equilibrium of BoS will move depending on the location of δ.
Another example of an invertible and discontinuous function is given by
g6(θ) =
{
(1− δ)θ/ǫ+ δ if θ ∈ [0, ǫ] ,
δ(π − θ)/(π − ǫ) if θ ∈ (ǫ, π] , (35)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) and ǫ ∈ (0, π) and it is drawn in Fig. 6. 
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                               δ  
 
 
         g  
 
 
 
 
   0      ε      θ    pi  
Figure 6: Invertible and discontinuous g-function defined in Eq. (35).
With this function the pure classical equilibria p⋆A = p
⋆
B = 0 of PD as well as
of BoS remain unaffected because these equilibria require θ = π, and the function
is not discontinuous at π. One notices that if the angle corresponding to a classical
equilibrium is 0, π/2, or π, and there is no discontinuity at π/2, then the quantum
correlation game can not change that equilibrium. With the function (35) in both
PD or BoS the pure equilibrium with p⋆A = p
⋆
B = 1 corresponds to the angle θ = ǫ
where classical and quantum correlations are different (for ǫ 6= π/2). Consequently, the
equilibrium p⋆A = p
⋆
B = 1 will be shifted and the new equilibrium depends on the angle
arccos(1 − 2ǫ/π). The mixed equilibrium of BoS will also be shifted by the function
(35). Therefore, one of the pure equilibria and the mixed equilibrium may shift if the
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g-function (35) is chosen. The following function
g7(θ) =
{
1− (1− δ)θ/ǫ if θ ∈ [0, ǫ] ,
δ(θ − ǫ)/(π − ǫ) if θ ∈ (ǫ, π] , (36)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) and ǫ ∈ (0, π), cannot change the pure equilibrium at p⋆A = p⋆B = 1.
However, it can affect the equilibrium p⋆A = p
⋆
B = 1, both in PD and BoS, and it can
shift the mixed equilibrium of BoS. Fig. 7 shows this function. 
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                               g  
 
 
 
          
         δ  
 
 
 
   0   θ    ε   pi  
Figure 7: Invertible and discontinuous g-function defined in Eq. (36).
(iii) Non-invertible and discontinuous g-functions
A simple case of a continuous and non-invertible function (cf. Fig, 8) is given by
g8(θ) =
{
2θ/π if θ ∈ [0, π
2
] ,
1− 2(θ − π
2
)/π if θ ∈ (π
2
, π] .
(37)
Consider a classical pure equilibrium with p⋆A = p
⋆
B = 0. Because g
−1(0) = 0 or π,
two equilibria with g {arccos(±1)} are generated in the quantum correlation game, but
these coincide and turn out to be same as the classical ones. Similarly, the function (37)
does not shift the pure classical equilibrium at p⋆A = p
⋆
B = 1. However, if p
⋆
A,B ∈ (0, 1)
corresponds to a mixed equilibrium such that g−1(p⋆) = θ⋆1, θ
⋆
2 6= π/2, then, in the
quantum correlation game, p⋆A,B will not only shift but also bifurcate. The resulting
values will differ from p⋆A,B.
Are the equilibria in a classical correlation game already susceptible to a non-
invertible and continuous g-function like (37)? When the players receive the classi-
cal pairs of objects, the angles θ⋆1, θ
⋆
2 are mapped to themselves, resulting in the same
probability p⋆, obtained now using the non-invertible and continuous g-function (37).
Therefore, in a classical correlation game played with the function (37) the bifurcation
observed in the quantum correlation game does not show up, in spite of the fact that
there are two angles associated with one probability.
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Figure 8: Non-invertible and continuous g-function defined in Eq. (37).
6 Summary and Discussion
In this paper, we propose a new approach to introduce a quantum mechanical version
of bi-matrix games. One of our main objectives has been to find a way to respect
two constraints when ‘quantizing’: on the one hand, no new moves should emerge in
the quantum game (c1) and, on the other hand, the payoff relations should remain
unchanged (c2). In this way, we hope to circumvent objections which have been raised
against existing procedures to quantize games. New quantum moves or modified payoff
relations do not necessarily indicate a true quantum character of a game since their
emergence can be understood in terms of a modified classical game.
Correlation games are based on payoff relations which are sensitive to whether the
input is anti-correlated classically or quantum mechanically. The players’ allowed moves
are fixed once and for all, and a setting inspired by EPR-type experiments is used. Alice
and Bob are both free to select a direction in prescribed planes PA,B; subsequently they
individually measure, on their respective halves of the supplied system, the value of a
dichotomic variable either along the selected axis or along the z-axis. When playing
mixed strategies, they must use probabilities which are related to the angles by a func-
tion g which is made public in the beginning. After many runs the arbiter establishes
the correlations between the measurement outcomes and rewards the players accord-
ing to fixed payoff relations PA,B. The rewards depend only on the numerical values
of the correlations—by definition, they do not make reference to classical or quantum
mechanics.
If the incoming states are classical, correlation games reproduce classical bi-matrix
games. The payoffs P clA,B and P
q
A,B correspond to one single game since both expressions
emerge from the same payoff relation PA,B. If the input consists of quantum mechanical
singlet states, however, the correlations turn quantum and the solutions of the corre-
lation game change. For example, in a generalized Prisoners’ Dilemma a mixed Nash
equilibrium can be found. This is due to an effective non-linear dependence of the pay-
off relations on the probabilities since the comparison of Eqs. (14) and (19) shows that
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‘quantization’ leads to the substitution
pA,B → Qg(pA,B) . (38)
As the payoffs of traditional bi-matrix games are bi-linear in the probabilities, it is
difficult, if not impossible, to argue that the quantum features of the quantum correlation
game would arise from a disguised classical game: there is no obvious method to let the
payoffs of a classical matrix game depend non-linearly on the strategies of the players.
Our analysis of the Prisoners’ Dilemma and the Battle of Sexes as quantum correla-
tion games shows that, typically, both structure and location of classical Nash equilibria
are modified. The location of the quantum equilibria depends sensitively on the proper-
ties of the function g but, apart from exceptional cases, the modifications are structurally
stable. It is not possible to create any desired type of solution for a bi-matrix game by
a smart choice of the function g.
Finally, we would like to comment on the link between correlation games and Bell’s
inequality. In spite of the similarity to an EPR-type experiment, it is not obvious how
to directly exploit Bell’s inequality in correlations games. Actually, its violation is not
crucial for the emergence of the modifications in the quantum correlation game, as one
can see from the following argument. Consider a correlation game played on a mixture
of quantum mechanical anti-correlated product states,
ρˆ =
1
4π
∫
Ω
dΩ |e+
Ω
, e−
Ω
〉〈e+
Ω
, e−
Ω
| , (39)
where the integration is over the unit sphere. The vectors e±Ω are of unit length, and |e±Ω〉
denote the eigenstates of the spin component eΩ · Sˆ with eigenvalues ±1, respectively.
The correlations in this entangled mixture are weaker than for the singlet state |ψ〉
〈ac〉ρ = −
1
3
cos θA , etc. (40)
The factor 1/3 makes a violation of Bell’s inequality impossible. Nevertheless, a classical
bi-matrix game is modified as before if ρˆ is chosen as input state of the correlation game.
To put this observation differently: the payoffs introduced in Eq. (8) depend on the two
correlations 〈ac〉 and 〈cb〉 only, not on the third one present in Bell’s inequality, 〈ab〉.
An interesting development of the present approach consists of defining payoffs of
correlation games in such a way that they become sensitive to a violation of Bell’s
inequality [10]. In this case, the construction would assure that the game involves non-
classical probabilities, impossible to obtain by whatever classical game.
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